Conventional wisdom holds that the models used to stress test banks should be kept secret to prevent gaming. We show instead that secrecy can be suboptimal, because although it deters gaming, it may also deter socially desirable investment. When the regulator can choose the minimum standard for passing the test, we show that secrecy is suboptimal if the regulator is sufficiently uncertain regarding bank characteristics.
Introduction
According to Federal Reserve officials, the models that are used to stress test banks are kept secret to prevent banks from gaming them. Indeed, if a bank knows that the Fed's models underestimate the risks of some class of assets, the bank can invest in those assets without fear of failing the test. However, banks complain about this secrecy, claiming that even their best efforts to prepare for a test could result in unexpected and costly failure. 1
Our main contribution is to present conditions under which, contrary to conventional wisdom and the statements of some policymakers, fully revealing the stress model to banks is optimal. 2 The results build on the idea that hidden models make banks cautious about risky investment, which could have two effects: banks may game less, but they may also invest less in socially desirable assets. Revealing the model leads to a better social outcome if the second effect dominates. This idea leads to three main results. First, if banks are sufficiently cautious about risky investment or if failing the test is sufficiently costly to them, revealing the regulator's model is optimal because it prevents underinvestment in socially desirable assets. Second, even if the regulator can adjust the test to make it easier to pass, revealing may still be optimal if uncertainty about the bank characteristics is sufficiently high, or if the regulator is forced to apply the same test to sufficiently different banks.
Third, if there is some social cost when banks fail the test, then the optimal disclosure policy may be nonmonotonic in bank characteristics. For example, revealing could be optimal when the bank's bias toward risky investment or the bank's private cost of failure is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. In our baseline model, the bank can invest in one of two portfolios: a safe 1 A recent proposal from the Federal Reserve suggests enhanced disclosure of the Fed models, such as revealing key variables and some equations, and illustrating how the Fed model will work on some hypothetical loan portfolios; but even under this proposal, the Fed will not reveal the exact models. See https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ FR-2017 FR- -12-15/pdf/2017 2 See former Fed Governor Tarullo's speech for arguments against fully revealing the model. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160926a.htm portfolio, which will surely pass the test, or a risky portfolio, which may or may not pass the test. We assume that the bank always prefers to invest in the risky portfolio, whereas the regulator prefers the risky portfolio only if its value during a crisis is sufficiently high. This value is represented by the state of nature. The bank knows more than the regulator about the value of the risky portfolio, and for simplicity, we assume that the bank observes the state with certainty.
We capture the idea of a hidden stress test model by assuming that the regulator observes a noisy signal of the state, and that the regulator passes a bank that invested in the risky portfolio if and only if the signal realization is above some threshold. If the bank fails the test, the regulator forces the bank to alter its portfolio, which we assume is costly for the bank. If the bank passes the test, the regulator leaves the bank's portfolio unchanged. Because the regulator bases his decision on a noisy signal, he could err by passing a bank that invested in a socially undesirable portfolio or by failing a bank that invested in a socially desirable portfolio.
When the regulator's model is hidden, the bank fears failure and is therefore cautious, investing only when its privately observed state exceeds some threshold. We refer to this threshold as the bank's cautious threshold. In contrast, when the regulator reveals his signal, and that signal exceeds the passing threshold, the bank invests in the risky portfolio regardless of its privately observed state. So the bank may invest in the risky portfolio even if it knows that doing so is harmful to society. In other words, the bank may game the test.
We compare between two disclosure regimes: a transparent regime under which the regulator reveals his signal to the bank before the bank selects a portfolio, and a secrecy regime in which the regulator's signal is kept secret.
We focus on two cases. In the first case, the regulator must follow an exogenously given threshold for passing or failing the bank. 3 In the second case, the regulator can choose the passing threshold optimally. So in the second case, the regulator has two tools to influence the bank's portfolio decision: the disclosure regime and the standard to which the bank is held. In both cases, the regulator announces and commits to the passing threshold publicly before the bank selects its portfolio.
In the first case with an exogenously given threshold, we show that revealing is optimal if the bank's cautious threshold is sufficiently high. This happens, for example, if the bank's cost of failing the test is sufficiently high.
Intuitively, in this case, the bank's fear of failing the test leads to a significant reduction in socially beneficial investment, and this reduction more than offsets the benefits from a reduction in a socially harmful investment.
In the second case in which the regulator can choose the passing threshold optimally, he can reassure an overly cautious bank by lowering the passing threshold, thereby making the test easier to pass. However, the bank's cautious threshold depends not only on the difficulty of the test but also on the bank's characteristics (e.g., cost of failing the test). If the regulator is certain about the bank characteristics, he can precisely calibrate the bank's cautious threshold by adjusting the passing threshold, so it is optimal to not reveal.
However, precise calibration is impossible when bank characteristics are unknown. We show that, under some conditions, if the regulator is sufficiently uncertain about the bank's characteristics, then revealing is optimal.
Finally, we focus on another force that increases the benefit of revealing the regulator's model. Failing the test and the resulting change in the bank's portfolio might be costly not only for the bank but also for society. We show that if the social cost of failing the test is sufficiently high, it is optimal to reveal the regulator's signal. If instead, the social cost of failing the test is low, the optimal disclosure regime depends on the bank's cautious threshold, and in particular, on the bank's cost of failing the test. Interestingly, the relationship between the optimal disclosure policy and the bank's cost of failure is not necessarily monotone.
For example, under some conditions, revealing is optimal when the bank's private cost of failing the test is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
Intuitively, if the cost is high, then fear of failing the test deters the bank from taking a socially desirable risk, and so it is optimal to reveal. If the cost is low, fear of failure does little to deter investment in socially harmful assets.
But then it is better to reveal to avoid the social cost of failing the bank. In other words, in this case, providing incentives to the bank via model secrecy is too costly for the regulator.
Before concluding, we discuss additional policy implications from our model.
In particular, we relate our results to three specific policies: the current policy of giving banks a short time to revise their capital plans, the proposal to reveal the Fed's estimated losses on hypothetical portfolios, and the suggestion to accompany greater model transparency with increased capital requirements.
Related Literature
The existing literature has focused on disclosure of regulators' stress test results to investors. 4 In contrast, we focus on disclosure of regulators' stress test models to banks. To our knowledge, we are the first paper to study this problem.
Our setting is a principal-agent problem in which the principal (the regulator) and agent (the bank) each have private information, the agent takes an action, and the principal can take a follow up action, which is costly both to the agent and to the principal. Our focus is on whether the principal should reveal his private information before the agent takes the action. Levit (2016) also considers a setting in which a principal can reverse the agent's action. In his basic setting, the principal is more informed than the agent, so intervention can protect the agent from bad outcomes. His paper shows that in some cases the principal can obtain a better outcome by recommending an action to an agent and committing not to intervene. In our setting, however, intervention is bad for the agent and is crucial for providing incentives; instead, the principal chooses whether or not to disclose information related to his intervention policy.
As in the delegation literature initiated by Holmstrom (1984) 5 , we rule out transfers between the two parties. The case in which the regulator reveals his information corresponds to a standard delegation problem in which the principal delegates partial authority to the agent. In particular, by revealing his signal, the regulator effectively restricts the bank's action space to those actions that will surely pass the test. In contrast, the case in which the regulator does not reveal his information is new to this literature and can be thought of as "delegation with hidden evaluation." The regulator does not restrict the set of actions that the bank can take (i.e., there is full delegation), but the regulator responds to the bank's action based on an evaluation process (a model) that is hidden from the bank. Our paper provides conditions under which hiding the evaluation process is preferred to revealing it.
The idea that uncertainty regarding the regulator policy can affect incentives appears in other settings. For example, Lazear (2006) shows hidden tests could be a way to induce a socially optimal action, such as studying or not speeding. In his setting, the regulator knows what the socially optimal action is, whereas in our setting the regulator does not know. The possibility of wrongful punishment in our setting can create excessive caution in banks, which is the driving force behind our results. Freixas (2000) offers some justification for "constructive ambiguity" of bank bailout policy by showing that under some conditions, it is optimal for the regulator to use a mixed bailout strategy. In our paper, the regulator follows a deterministic policy rule to pass or fail a bank, but the rule is based on information that could be unknown to the bank.
Finally, there is a large empirical literature that documents how political and regulatory uncertainty can affect the real economy, including reducing investment. 6 In particular, Gissler, Oldfather, and Ruffino (2016) offer evidence which suggests that uncertainty about the regulation of qualified mortgages caused banks to reduce mortgage lending. The literature is consistent with the idea in our paper that hidden tests could induce the bank to invest less.
Model
There are two agents: a bank and a regulator. The bank can invest in either a risky portfolio or a safe portfolio. The payoff from investing in the risky portfolio depends on an unobservable state ω ∈ Ω ≡ [ω,ω] ⊂ R. The payoff to the bank is u(ω) and the payoff to the regulator is v(ω). The payoff to the regulator represents the payoff to society. The payoff from investing in the safe portfolio does not depend on the state, and is normalized to zero for both the bank and regulator. That is, u and v are the relative gains from investing in the risky portfolio, compared to the safe portfolio.
For example, in the context of stress tests, the state ω could represent the value of the risky portfolio in a crisis, and the functions u and v could represent the bank and regulator's expected payoffs, which take into account the probability of a crisis, the resulting losses, the payoffs during normal times, etc.
We assume that u and v are continuous and differentiable. We also assume that:
Assumption 1. u and v are strictly increasing.
Assumption 2. For all ω ∈ Ω, u(ω) > v(ω).
6 For example, Julio and Yook (2012) document that high political uncertainty causes firms to reduce investment during election years. Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) document that temporarily high uncertainty about fiscal policy reduces output, consumption, and investment. See also Pástor and Veronesi (2013) and Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) .
Assumption 1 implies that both the regulator and the bank prefer higher value. Assumption 2 implies the risky portfolio is more valuable to the bank than to the regulator. This assumption captures the idea that the bank does not internalize the social cost associated with risk. Assumption 3 captures the idea that the regulator may not know which portfolio is best for society. The regulator prefers the risky portfolio only if its value during a crisis is sufficiently high. For use below, we define ω r to be the unique zero of v.
For simplicity, we assume that the bank always prefers to invest in the risky portfolio. 7
Assumption 4. For all ω ∈ Ω, u(ω) > 0.
The regulator and the bank begin with a common prior belief about the state ω, which prior belief is summarized by a continuous distribution function G(ω) with support Ω. Before the bank selects its portfolio, the regulator and the bank receive private signals about ω. For simplicity, we assume that the bank receives a perfect signal-i.e., it observes ω. The regulator, however, receives a noisy signal s ∈ S ⊂ R that follows a continuous distribution conditional on ω. We let F (s|ω) and f (s|ω) denote the cumulative distribution function and density function of the signal s conditional on ω.
Assumption 5 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property). If ω > ω, then the ratio f (s|ω )/f (s|ω) is strictly increasing in s.
Assumption 5 implies that 1 − F (s|ω) is strictly increasing in ω. 8 That is, the regulator is more likely to observe higher signals when the state ω is higher.
After the bank chooses its portfolio, the regulator assesses the value of the bank's portfolio-i.e., the regulator performs a stress test. If the bank chooses a safe portfolio, we assume the regulator passes the bank. If the bank chooses a risky portfolio, the regulator uses his private information s to decide whether to pass the bank. We assume that the bank passes if the signal s exceeds some threshold; we consider not only exogenous thresholds but also the case in which the threshold is optimally chosen by the regulator. Passing the test means the regulator leaves the bank's portfolio unchanged, whereas failing the test means the regulator requires the bank to replace the risky portfolio with the safe portfolio. This replacement incurs a cost c b > 0 to the bank and c s ≥ 0 to the regulator. For example, these costs could represent the opportunity cost of delaying investment in the safe portfolio. 9 We allow that the regulator may be uncertain about the bank's cost of failing the test, The focus of the paper is whether the regulator should reveal or not reveal his private signal s to the bank. The sequence of events is as follows.
1. The regulator publicly commits to either reveal or not reveal his private signal.
2. Nature chooses the state ω. The bank privately observes ω, and the regulator privately observes the signal s.
3. In accordance with his prior commitment in step (1), the regulator either reveals or does not reveal his signal. 4. The bank selects a portfolio: risky or safe.
5.
The regulator conducts the test, passing or failing the bank. 6. Payoffs are realized.
• If the bank invested in the safe portfolio, both the bank and regulator receive 0. 9 We assume that investment in the risky portfolio is available only before the stress test.
• If the bank invested in the risky portfolio, then if the bank passes the test, the bank receives u(ω) and the regulator receives v(ω);
if the bank fails the test, the bank receives −c b and the regulator receives −c s .
Exogenous Pass/Fail Rule
We begin our analysis with the case in which the regulator follows an exogenously given threshold rule for passing or failing the bank. So the only decisions are in step (1) for the regulator and step (4) for the bank. In this section, we focus on the special case in which: (i) the regulator has no uncertainty regarding the bank's private cost c b of failing the test, so the regulator's beliefs are a point mass at a particular c b > 0; and (ii) the social cost c s of failing the bank is zero. In Section 6, we discuss the case in which c s > 0, which will give us more results.
Let s e be the exogenously given, publicly known threshold such that if the regulator receives a signal s ≥ s e , the bank passes the test. We first characterize the bank's investment decision. Then, we compare the regulator payoffs under the two regimes: revealing the signal and not revealing. Assume that if the bank is indifferent between investing and not investing, the bank invests.
If the regulator reveals his signal s to the bank, the bank invests if and only if it expects to pass the test-that is, the bank invests when s ≥ s e , irrespective of ω. This follows because the bank's payoff from investing and passing the test is positive for all states ω ∈ Ω, the payoff from not investing is zero, and the payoff from investing and failing the test is negative. So when the regulator reveals s, the bank uses its knowledge of the test to act in a way that improves its payoff, regardless of the impact on society; i.e., the bank games the test.
If, instead, the regulator does not reveal his signal, the bank's action de-pends only on the bank's private information, the state ω. Conditional on ω, the bank's expected payoff from investing is [1 − F (s e |ω)]u(ω) − F (s e |ω)c b . In particular, with probability 1 − F (s e |ω), the bank passes the test and obtains u(ω), and with probability F (s e |ω), the bank fails the test and suffers a cost c b . If the bank does not invest, its payoff is zero. Hence, the bank invests in state ω if and only if
(1)
Next, we show that the bank follows a threshold investment policy: it invests if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Specifically, if the left-hand side of (1) is negative for all ω ∈ Ω, the bank never invests. Otherwise, denote the lowest 10 ω ∈ Ω that satisfies (1) by ω b (s e ). Because the left-hand side is strictly increasing in ω, the bank invests if and only if ω ≥ ω b (s e ). We refer to ω b (s e ) as the bank's cautious threshold.
The cautious threshold can be found as follows. If the left-hand side is positive at ω, then ω b (s e ) = ω; otherwise, ω b (s e ) is the unique zero of the lefthand side, and by the implicit function theorem must be strictly increasing in s e . Intuitively, when the threshold for passing the test is higher, the bank is less likely to invest because it is more afraid of failing the test.
The next lemma summarizes the results above: 
If the regulator does not reveal his signal, the bank invests if ω ≥ ω b (s e ),
and if the bank invests in state ω, the bank passes the test with probability 1 − F (s e |ω). Hence, the regulator's expected payoff is
Equations (2) and (3) show the effect of revealing the regulator's signal s:
the bank invests for more states ω. That is, when the regulator reveals his signal, the bank invests for all ω ∈ Ω, but when the regulator does not reveal
It is optimal for the regulator to reveal his signal if V r (s e ) ≥ V n (s e ). Rearranging terms, we obtain that it is optimal to reveal if and only if
Hence, whether it is optimal to reveal depends on whether the additional investment in states [ω, ω b (s e )] is socially beneficial. As we explain below, the net effect from this additional investment on the regulator's expected payoff can be either positive or negative.
Specifically, if ω b (s e ) ≤ ω r , the left-hand side of (4) is negative, capturing the idea that revealing the signal causes the bank to invest in socially undesirable projects. On the other hand, if ω b (s e ) > ω r , the left-hand side can be written as the sum of two terms:
and
Expression (5) is negative and represents the cost of revealing the signal, as mentioned above. We refer to this as the overinvestment effect of revealing the signal. Expression (6) is positive and represents a benefit of revealing the signal, which is that the bank invests in more states in which it is socially desirable to do so. Specifically, if the regulator does not reveal the signal, the bank does not invest in states ω ∈ [ω r , ω b (s e )), which would have given a positive social payoff v(ω). Revealing the signal avoids this underinvestment effect.
The discussion above suggests that it is optimal to reveal only if the underinvestment effect (6) of not revealing the signal is sufficiently high or the overinvestment effect (5) of revealing the signal is sufficiently low. The next proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 1. Given a passing threshold s e such that V r (s e ) > 0, there exists ω I ∈ (ω r ,ω) such that the regulator prefers to:
The Proposition shows that whether it is optimal for the regulator to reveal his signal depends on the bank's cautious threshold ω b . When ω b is sufficiently high, it is optimal to reveal because not revealing induces the bank to invest too little in socially desirable projects. In contrast, if the cautious threshold ω b is sufficiently low, but still above ω, it is optimal to not reveal because then the bank invests less in socially undesirable projects.
Using Proposition 1, we can derive comparative statics as to how the regulator's optimal disclosure policy changes when model parameters change. For example, consider ω b . Observe that the cautious threshold ω b is increasing in the bank's cost c b of failing the test. Hence, we have the following.
Corollary 1. Given a passing threshold s e such that V r (s e ) > 0, there exists c b ∈ (0, ∞) such that the regulator prefers to:
In general, the bank's cautious threshold ω b , which reflects the bank's reluctance to invest when the regulator's signal is hidden, depends not only on the bank's cost c b of failing the test, but also on the bank's utility function to ω b , they would produce comparative statics similar to Corollary 1.
Optimal Pass/Fail Rule
The message of Proposition 1 is that revelation is optimal when the bank is too cautious about investment otherwise. However, if the regulator can choose and commit to an optimal s e , then he has two ways to reassure an overly cau- 
Optimal passing thresholds
If the regulator reveals his signal, the bank can perfectly avoid test failure, so its investment behavior is independent of c b . Hence, the regulator's payoff V r (s) under revealing is identical to (2) in the previous section.
We can show that V r (s) is strictly quasiconcave and therefore has a unique maximum s r ∈ S. That is,
To see why, observe that Hence, the regulator's payoff under not revealing is
Observe that in the special case in which the regulator knows the bank's type (i.e., H has all of the mass on a particular c b ), k(s, ω) is a step function, and (7) reduces to (3).
Let s n denote an optimal passing threshold if the regulator chooses to not reveal. That is,
Then it is optimal to reveal if and only if V r (s r ) ≥ V n (s n ).
Regulator knows c b
As a benchmark, we start with the case in which the regulator knows the bank's cost of failing the test. The next lemma shows that in this case, it is optimal to reveal the test.
Lemma 2. If the regulator can optimally choose with commitment the passing thresholds s r and s n , the regulator has no uncertainty about c b , and c s = 0, then for all c b ≥ 0 it is weakly optimal to not reveal.
Intuitively, suppose the regulator used the optimal revealing threshold under both disclosure regimes. If not revealing were worse than revealing, it must be due to underinvestment. But then, the regulator could simply reduce the not-revealing threshold to eliminate underinvestment without inducing overinvestment, and also pass the bank more frequently than under revealing.
Regulator does not know c b
Now suppose the regulator does not know the bank's cost of failing the test. In this case, the regulator cannot eliminate underinvestment without increasing overinvestment, as he did in Lemma 2, because a test that eliminates underinvestment for one type of bank increases overinvestment for other types. When types are very similar to one another, the regulator can still increase his payoff above V r (s r ) by making the test easier and not revealing it. So, not revealing is optimal. However, when types are very different from one another, the regulator cannot reach the payoff V r (s r ) by making the test easier. In this case, revealing becomes optimal.
Hence, one might expect that if the regulator is sufficiently uncertain regarding the bank's cost of failure c b , it is optimal to reveal, and otherwise, it is optimal not to reveal. In the following example, this intuitive prediction is confirmed. does not depend on the level of uncertainty, whereas the payoff from not revealing V n (s n ) is strictly decreasing in the level of uncertainty. For a very low level of uncertainty, not revealing is strictly optimal. For a very high level of uncertainty, revealing is strictly optimal.
To obtain more intuition for the result in Example 1, observe that from Equation (7), the regulator's payoff V n (s) depends on the product of two functions: the probability k(s, ω) that the bank invests in state ω and the prob- To see why revealing is optimal when uncertainty about c b is very high, consider panel 3c. In this case, the function k(s n , ω) is nearly horizontal.
That is, the probability that the bank invests is very insensitive to the state ω. Intuitively, when a large fraction of types have a very low cost of failure and a large fraction of types have a very high cost, those with the low cost invest in all states ω, those with high cost invest in no states, and only a very small fraction of types with intermediate cost favor higher states. Therefore, by adjusting the passing threshold, the regulator doesn't change the relative likelihood of investment in good states ω versus bad states ω; instead he simply scales the probability of investment, which is roughly constant across ω. For example, by lowering the passing threshold s, the regulator can induce some additional types with low cost to invest, but he cannot induce them to invest only when it is socially optimal to invest. So, instead of essentially avoiding investment in all states, these types invest in almost every state, which means that when the regulator reduces underinvestment, he increases overinvestment.
In this case, if the regulator wanted to scale up the investment level, he would need to reduce the passing threshold significantly, ending up passing the bank in almost every state. But then revealing the regulator's signal is optimal because the regulator sets a high threshold for passing the test and uses its information to eliminate some socially undesirable investment.
Social Cost of Failing the Bank
In this section, we examine whether it is optimal to reveal or not reveal the regulator's signal s when the social cost c s of failing the bank is strictly positive. We illustrate our result for the case in which the passing threshold s e is exogenous and the regulator knows the bank's cost c b of failure. 
The first term represents the case in which the bank invests and the regulator passes the bank. The second term represents the case in which the bank invests and fails the test.
Comparing (9) 3. As c s decreases fromc s to 0, ω I strictly decreases to ω andω I strictly increases to a value strictly less thanω.
Part 1 captures the idea that when the social cost of failure is high, the regulator would like to prevent failure by revealing the signal. In part 2, the social cost of failure is low, and whether revealing is optimal depends not only on the cost of failure but also on how not revealing affects the bank's investment decision. There are two circumstances in which it is optimal to reveal. The first case is when not revealing the signal does very little to prevent investment in bad projects-i.e., ω b (s e ) is very low. In that case, revealing the signal induces only slightly worse investment behavior but avoids the cost of failure. The second case is when not revealing the signal deters not only bad investment but also much good investment-i.e., ω b (s e ) is very high. In that case, revealing the signal permits this good investment and also avoids the cost of test failure.
Because ω b (s e ) is increasing in c b , we obtain the following immediate corollary, which is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Corollary 2. Given passing threshold s e , if c s >c s , revealing is optimal for
c s <c s ) such that the regulator's optimal policy is to 
Policy Implications
In this section, we show how the insights of our model can shed light on current and suggested stress testing policies.
1. In practice, banks whose capital plans would lead their capital to fall below the required level are given a short time to adjust their plans. 14 In our model, this practice could imply a lower private cost for banks from failing the test. 15 Our model suggests that if the social cost of chosen and c s > 0, but we omit it in the text because the intuition is similar to Lemma 2. In that case, for any positive c s , not revealing is optimal for high enough c b , because the optimal cautious threshold ω b may be induced with a low passing threshold and therefore a low probability of costly test failure.
14 See https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-12-15/pdf/2017-26856.pdf 15 Earlier, we thought of c b as the opportunity cost of delaying investment in the safe portfolio, but c b could also represent other costs, such as the embarrassment involved with failing a bank is zero, a lower c b implies the regulator should disclose less. However, if the social cost of a failing a bank is positive, the impact of a lower c b on optimal disclosure is more nuanced. In particular, if c b descends from a high value to a middle value, the regulator should disclose less. But if c b descends from a middle value to a low value, the regulator should disclose more.
2.
A widely expressed concern is that disclosing the Fed's models could increase correlations in asset holdings among banks subject to the stress tests (i.e., the largest banks), making the financial system more vulnerable to adverse financial shocks. A recent proposal suggests that the Fed reveals the outcome of applying its models to hypothetical loan portfolios. 16 An extension of our model would suggest that such enhanced disclosure could also increase correlations in asset holdings. The proposed hypothetical portfolios could serve as benchmark portfolios in which too many banks invest, leading to correlated investment. So just as in our basic model, in which the bank could underinvest in a socially valuable risky portfolio by choosing the safe portfolio for which the test results are predictable, in practice, banks could underinvest in their idiosyn- only partially correct. In particular, as we show in Proposition 4 in the appendix, for some parameter values, revealing is strictly preferred to not revealing, yet, the optimal passing threshold under revealing is lower than the optimal passing threshold under not revealing. Intuitively, this happens when the social cost of failure is high enough, so that revealing is optimal, but the banks private cost of failing the test is low, so that deterring overinvestment under not revealing requires a very high threshold: s n > s r .
Conclusion
We present conditions under which it is socially optimal for a regulator to reveal his stress testing model to the bank. The framework we present allows that banks may game a publicly known model, the chief concern underlying the Federal Reserve's policy of model secrecy. We show that despite the possibility of gaming, revealing the model may still be optimal, because uncertainty about the regulator's model may prevent banks from investing in socially valuable assets. In addition, even when the regulator can reassure cautious banks by relaxing the minimum standard to which they are held, revealing may be optimal if the regulator is sufficiently uncertain about bank characteristics.
Finally, we show that if causing the bank to fail a stress test is socially costly, the optimal disclosure policy may be nonmonotonic in bank characteristics;
that is, revealing may be optimal for banks that have very high or very low private cost of failure.
We are currently working on understanding optimal partial disclosure rules.
For example, the regulator may commit to identifying an interval in which his private signal falls. Alternately, the regulator may commit to a stochastic map from his privately observed signal to an arbitrary message space, in the manner of Bayesian persuasionà la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . Relatedly, if particular asset classes are more relevant to the stress test model than others, the regulator may make distinct disclosure decisions regarding different classes of assets. The regulator will choose to reveal if V r (s r ) < V n (s n ). We show this is true for sufficiently low bank cost of failure c b .
Proposition 3. If the regulator can optimally choose with commitment the passing thresholds s n and s r , then for all c s ≥ 0, there exists a c b > 0 such that the regulator's optimal policy is to
Either otherwise.
Furthermore, as c s increases to infinity, c b strictly increases to infinity.
Intuitively, for any positive c s , not revealing is optimal for high enough c b , because the optimal cautious threshold ω b may be induced with a low passing threshold and therefore a low probability of costly test failure.
Although it may seem that model opacity and high capital thresholds are policy substitutes for deterring overinvestment, the following proposition shows that when it is optimal to disclose the regulator's private signal, there are cases in which the optimal threshold under revealing is lower than under not revealing.
Proposition 4. There exists a c s > 0 and c b > 0 such that revealing is strictly optimal and s r < s n .
If the regulator does not reveal the model and the bank's cost of test failure is low, the only way to deter bad investments is to set the capital requirement very high, so high that the regulator fails the bank even when the regulator's private signal indicates the asset has positive social value. (Mathematically, E[v(ω) |s n ] > 0]). The optimal not revealing threshold s n balances the marginal cost of failing good banks with the marginal benefit of deterring bad investment. When c b is very low, this marginal benefit is very small compared to the marginal cost, so at the optimal threshold s n , only very little bad investment is deterred.
Under revealing, if c s is sufficiently high, the optimal threshold s r is lower than s n , and the regulator is better off. Why? Under revealing, setting a very high threshold does nothing to deter bad investment, because the bank invests in all states whenever it expects to pass, so the regulator optimally sets the threshold so that all banks with weakly positive expected value pass (that is, E[v(ω)|s r ] = 0). Therefore, the threshold is lower under revealing.
The regulator is also better off because the avoided social costs of failure c s dominate the very small additional bad investment due to gaming. Proof of Lemma 2. If V n (s r ) ≥ V r (s r ), then V n (s n ) ≥ V n (s r ) ≥ V r (s r ), so not revealing is weakly optimal. On the other hand, if V n (s r ) < V r (s r ),
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. For fixed s e and F (s|ω), denote
By Equation (9), revealing is strictly preferred if J(c s , ω b (s e )) > 0, not revealing is strictly preferred if J(c s , ω b (s e )) < 0, and the regulator is indifferent if
which has the same sign as
(Part 1): We first show that J(c s , ·) is strictly quasiconvex and, therefore, has a unique minimizer in [ω,ω] . If c s = 0, then by Assumption 1, (10) is strictly decreasing when ω < ω r and strictly increasing when ω > ω r . (By Assumption 5, F (s e |ω) > 0 for every ω > ω.) If c s > 0, then if ω b ≤ ω r , (10) is strictly negative, and if ω b > ω r , (10) is strictly increasing in ω b , crossing zero at most once. So J(c s , ·) is strictly quasiconvex. We denote the unique minimizer in [ω,ω] , as ω m (c s ). If (10) [ω r ,ω), applying the implicit function theorem to (10) gives
so ω b (c s ) is weakly increasing in c s , and must therefore converge to some limit unique ω I ∈ [ω, ω m (c s )) and a uniqueω I ∈ (ω m (c s ),ω) which satisfy Applying the implicit function theorem gives ω I (c s ) = − ∂J ∂cs / ∂J ∂ω b (cs,ω I (cs)) . Because ω m (c s ) is the unique zero of (10) and ω I (c s ) < ω m (c s ), it must be that Next, we show that there exists a c b > 0 such that V n strictly dominates V r .
Note that ωr v(ω)dG(ω) > V r (s r ). By the continuity of F (s|ω), there exists an
By the continuity of V n (c s , ·, s n (c s , ·)), there exists at least one c b > 0 such that V n (c s , c b , s n (c s , c b )) = V r (s r ). We now show that V n (c s , ·, s n (c s , ·))
is strictly increasing at any c b , which implies c b is unique. By the envelope theorem,
where we have abbreviated s n (c s , c b ) and ω b (s n (c s , c b ), c b ) with s n and ω b , re-
To sign the second factor of (11), consider
.
(12) ω) , which implies the first term of (12) is strictly negative, and the second term is weakly negative. But then ∂Vn(cs,c b ,s) ∂s (c b ,sn) < 0, contradicting the optimality of s n ∈ (s,s). So
sn) < 0, and therefore from (11) we have that dVn(cs,c b ,sn(cs,c b ))
> 0. So wherever V n (c s , c b , s n ) = V r (s r ), V n must be strictly increasing in c b ; together with the continuity of V n (c s , ·, s n ), this implies that V n (c s , ·, s n ) must cross V r (s r ) exactly once, namely at c b .
Suppose c s = 0. If c b = 0, then for all s ∈ S, ω b (s, 0) = ω, V (0, 0, s) = V r (s), so s n = s r , and therefore V n (s n ) = V r (s r ). Using an identical argument to the case of c s > 0, there exists a c b > 0 such that V n strictly dominates V r . Now consider (11) for c s = 0 and c b > 0. First note that ω b <ω and therefore s n <s, as otherwise V n = 0, which is strictly dominated by selecting some s <s such that ω b (s, c b ) = ω r . Next, note that if [1 − F (s n |ω b )]v(ω b ) ≥ 0,
then ω b ∈ [ω r ,ω) and s n ∈ (s,s), which implies the first term of (12) is strictly negative and the second term is weakly negative, contradicting the optimality of s n > s. So ([1 − F (s n )]|v(ω b ) < 0, and since ∂ω b (s,c b ) ∂c b ≥ 0, (11) implies V n (0, c b , s n (0, c b )) is weakly increasing in c b . So for c s = 0, let c b be the smallest c b such that V n (0, c b , s n (0, c b )) = V r (s r ).
To show that for c s = 0, c b > 0, we show that there exists a c b > 0 such that .
At c b = c b , ω b and s n are interior, so ∂Vn ∂cs = − ω b F (s n |ω)dG(ω) < 0, and from above, ∂Vn ∂c b > 0, which gives c b (c s ) > 0. Finally, to show that lim cs→∞ c b (c s ) = ∞, We first show that lim cs→∞ V n (c s , c b , s n (c s , c b )) exists and is strictly less than V r (s r ). Note that dVn(cs,c b ,sn(cs,c b ) dcs = ∂Vn ∂cs = − ω b F (s n |ω)dG(ω) ≤ 0, so the optimized V n is weakly decreasing in c s and therefore the limit exists. If lim inf cs→∞ s n (c s , c b ) = s, so there exists s > s r such that V n (0,ĉ b , s) > V n (0,ĉ b , s r ). Therefore, V n (0,ĉ b , s + n (0)) > V n (0,ĉ b , s r ) = V r (s r ). By the maximum theorem and the envelope theorem, as c s increases from zero to infinity, V n (·,ĉ b , s + n (·)) decreases continuously from V n (0,ĉ b , s + n (0)) > V r (s r ) to zero. So there existsĉ s > 0 such that V n (ĉ s ,ĉ b , s + n (ĉ s )) = V r (s r ). Also note that for all s ∈ (s, s r ], V n (ĉ s ,ĉ b , s) < V r (s) ≤ V r (s r ), and for s = s, V n (ĉ s ,ĉ b , s) = V r (s) < V r (s r ). Therefore, V n (ĉ s ,ĉ b , s − n (ĉ s )) < V r (s r ) = V n (ĉ s ,ĉ b , s + n (ĉ s )).
Because V n (·,ĉ b , s − n (·)) and V n (·,ĉ b , s + n (·)) are continuous and strictly decreasing atĉ s , there exists c s >ĉ s such that V n (c s ,ĉ b , s − n (c s )) < V n (c s ,ĉ b , s + n (c s )) < V r (s r ). Therefore, s n (c s ,ĉ b ) = s + n (c s ) > s r and V n (c s ,ĉ b , s n (c s ,ĉ b )) < V r (s r ).
